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under the commerce head? The possibilities are well summed up in
the following passage:
The view in question represents a break with the past. The formalism,
the atmosphere of unreality, which pervade the previous decisions are
absent. Constitutional adjudication is achieved not by the application of a
mechanical formula but by the elemental process of examining the facts. 28
Also:
Parliament has been denied adequate regulatory control over business,
trades, industry and related activities-has been denied adequate control
over the economic life of the nation. This lacuna is due to the restrictive
judicial approach to the interpretation of the commerce clause. In Canada
'the federal commerce power' has not been 'as broad as the economic
needs of the nation'. Whether the influence of recent developments Is to
be permitted to rectify this state of affairs, only the future will tell.29
W. P. GRANT
R. v. McKAY [1964], 1 O.R. 641, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 (C.A.)-CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES-
ZONING BY-LAW PROHIBITING SIGNS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY-APPLICA-
BILITY TO FEDERAL ELECTION SIGNS-In the recent decision of R. v.
McKay1 the Ontario Court of Appeal reinstated a conviction for
breach of a by-law,2 enacted under the authority of the Municipal
Act 3 and the Planning Act, 4 prohibiting the posting of signs, includ-
ing election signs, on private property. The McKays owned a house
in the township of Etobicoke in a residential area designated R2.
During the last federal election they had attached to a wire over
their veranda a 14" x 16" sign proclaiming: "Vote David Middleton,
New Democratic Party". They were convicted before a magistrate.
On appeal before Hughes J. in the Supreme Court of Ontario5
the conviction was successfully attacked on the basis that although
28 Smith, p. 172.
29 bid, at p. 180.
1 [1964] 1 O.R. 641; (1964) 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401.
2 USE: No building, structure or land shall be used and no building or
structure shall be hereafter erected, structurally altered, enlarged or main-
tained except for the following uses:
9.3.1.7. SIGNS: Signs in accordance with the regulations in s. 6.14.
S. 6.14(e). SIGNS: Residential-one non-illuminated real estate sign not
exceeding four square feet in area, advertising the sale, rental or lease of
any building, structure or lot and/or one non-illuminated trespassing, safety
or caution sign not exceeding one square foot in area, and/or one sign Indi-
cating the name and profession of a physician shall be permitted.
3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 249, s. 379(1), para. 122. "By-laws may be passed by the
councils of local municipalities, 122. For prohibiting or regulating the erection
or signs or other advertising devices and the posting of notices on buildings
or vacant lots within any defined area or areas on or land abutting on any
defined highway or part of a highway."
4 R.S.O. 1960, c. 296, s. 30(1), para. 2. "By-laws may be passed by the
councils of municipalities, 2. For prohibiting the erection or use of buildings
or structures for or except for such purposes as may be set out in the by-law
within the municipality or within any defined -area or areas or upon land
abutting on any defined highway or part of a highway."
5 [1963] 2 O.R. 162; 38 D.L.R. (2d) 668.
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the by-law was not invalid per se it could not be construed as pro-
hibiting the erection of election signs or posters. Hughes J. reasoned
that "the display of signs and posters at election time cannot be con-
sidered as an element in the user of land any more than the display
of coloured lights at Christmas time or of decorations generally to
mark occasions of national holidays and rejoicing". 6 The by-law con-
temp lated signs only in relation to the established use of land and not
in the wider sense of regulation authorized by s. 379 of the Municipal
Act.7 The signs, therefore, not being a user of land, and the by-law
not being intended to regulate signs qua signs, the by-law in question
had no application to the election banner and the conviction was
quashed. Hughes J. also based his decision on a second and more
substantial ground, namely, that the posting of the election banner
related to "proceedings at elections", a field which the Dominion
Parliament had occupied by enacting the Canada Elections Act.8 The
learned Justice found that the circumstances did not justify a declara-
tion that the by-law was wholly ultra vires because it could have a
salutary effect in other circumstances; however, it did not extend to
prohibit the display of election posters during federal elections.
The Court of Appeal curtly dismissed the first ground of decision
below-which point was conceded by the respondents-saying that
"so far as an election sign is concerned, the legislation deals specifi-
cally with the question of signs and. . . that is sufficient without a
consideration of whether or not a particular sign is an element of
user of the particular property". 9 As regards the second basis for
decision, Aylesworth J.A., who delivered the oral judgment of the
court, observed that the phrase contained in s. 41 of the B.N.A. Act,10
namely, "proceedings at elections" is so broad and imprecise that in
its application it could conceivably cover much of what is considered
property and civil rights in the province. He then presented some
illustrations of how political parades and rallies which are incident
to an election might interfere with traffic and the important civil
right of passage on a thoroughfare. Presumably these illustrations
serve to demonstrate that the same subject matter may have different
constitutional aspects of varying importance depending on the cir-
cumstances. He then concludes that "proceedings at elections" in this
6 Id. at 167.
7 R.S.O., 1960, c. 249.
8 Statutes of Canada 1960, c. 39.
9 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 at 403.
10 The British North American Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, s. 41.
"Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, all Laws in force in
the several Provinces at the Union relative to the following Matters or any
of them, namely,-the Qualifications and Disqualifications of Persons to be
elected or to sit or vote as Members of the House of Assembly or Legislative
Assembly in the several Provinces, the Voters at Elections or such Members,
the Oaths to be taken by Voters, the Returning Officers, their Powers and
Duties, the Proceedings at Elections, the Periods during which Elections may
be continued, the Trial of controverted Elections, and Proceedings incident
thereto, the vacating of Seats of Members, and the Execution of new Writs
in case of Seats vacated otherwise than by Dissolution,--shall respectively
apply to Elections of Members to serve in the House of Commons for the
same Provinces."
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broad sense is a field of concurrent jurisdiction and "that until and
unless the Parliament of Canada sees fit to legislate upon a particu-
lar subject under the heading of 'proceedings at elections', which
particular subject falls within the ambit of property and civil rights,
the Province is at liberty to legislate upon the question of such
property and civil rights and in doing so is not improperly invading
a field exclusively reserved to the Parliament of Canada". 1 The field
being unoccupied, 12 the province, or by its authority a municipality,
is free to enact zoning by-laws which would, in certain defined resi-
dential areas, prohibit the display of election signs for the purpose
of protecting the rights of the neighbours of a politically exuberant
individual to the enjoyment of their land. Granted that the signs
might not be dangerous per se or constitute a nuisance, they might
"yet be inelegant, inartistic, [or] otherwise objectionable to the sur-
rounding residents in the enjoyment of their property in the area".
13
It is submitted that the court, by failing to follow the established
canons of constitutional construction, erred in its conclusions. The
method of approach enunciated by the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in John Deere Pow Co. v. WhartonM is to ask, first,
whether the challenged law has any feature of meaning which might
reasonably cause it to fall within one of or more of the provincial
classes of laws in s. 92 of the B.1N.A. Act. Assuming that it does pos-
sess a "provincial" feature, the next step is to consider whether it
also has features which would reasonably cause it to fall within the
scope of federal legislative jurisdiction.' 5 If the answer to this second
question is in the affirmative, the Court is confronted with the classic
constitutional issue, the competition between the powers assigned to
the Dominion and the provinces. It is then the task of the court to
weigh the relative importance of the competing interests and factors
which would incline the scales in favour of the exclusive jurisdiction
of either the Dominion Parliament or the provincial legislature.
In this casenote the problem will be approached by, first, accept-
ing the construction placed on the by-law by the Court of Appeal,
namely, that it was intended to include election signs during the
11 (1963), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 at 404.
12 Surprisingly federal legislation in relation to printed advertisements
and handbills having reference to an election is confined to the following
provision. "Every printed advertisement, handbill, placard, poster or dodger
having reference to any election shall bear the name and address of its printer
and publisher, and any person printing, publishing, distributing or posting up,
or causing to be printed, published, distributed or posted up, any such docu-
ment unless it bears such name and address is guilty of an offence against
this Act punishable on summary conviction as provided in this Act, and if
he is a candidate or the official agent of a candidate is further guilty of an
illegal practice." Canada Elections Act, 1960, c. 39, s. 71.
13 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401 at 405.
14 [1915] A.C. 330.
Is Although this test was devised specifically with the competition be-
tween s. 91 and s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act in mind, it is submitted that there is
no essential difference in principle where legislative competence with respect
to a given subject matter is conferred on the Parliament of Canada through
some section other than s. 91.
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course of a federal election, and then submitting the by-law to the
test authoritatively pronounced in the John Deere Plow Co. case.1 6
It is the contention of the writer that the display of election signs on
private property during the course of a federal election has aspects
which fall within the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of both the
Dominion and the provinces. The balance of the casenote will be de-
voted to an assessment of the competing interests: the right of prop-
erty owners to prevent the temporary display in the neighbourhood
of election posters on the ground that it offends their taste or detracts
from the appearance of the neighbourhood, and the right of a candi-
date to reach the public through election signs. If on this basis it is
determined that it is within the provincial legislative competence to
authorize the by-law, that determines the matter; however, if such
legislative power cannot be attributed to the province, it will be neces-
sary to re-evaluate the intended scope of the by-law.
It is readily apparent that signs in general involve a user of the
property on which they are placed, and the right to place them in a
given location is a civil right. Even when consideration is focused on
election signs as a particular species of the genus "sign", it is clear
that their display constitutes a user of property. Therefore, the sub-
ject matter of the impugned by-law, namely, signs, and election signs
in particular, presents an aspect which touches upon provincial legis-
lative jurisdiction.
The question whether the subject matter of this by-law has an
aspect touching upon the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of
Canada may be approached from two directions: first, by considering
whether the display of election posters falls within s. 41 of the B.N.A.
Act as "Proceedings at elections"; secondly, by asking whether the
display of these electioneering advertisements goes to the core of free-
dom of speech, transcending mere civil rights in the province, and is
not a proper subject of provincial legislation.
It is submitted that the phrase "proceedings at elections", appear-
ing as it does in s. 41 of the B.N.A. Act, must have some meaning.
The existence of provisions in the Canada Elections Act"7 relating to
lists of electors, notices and other documents required by the Act to
be posted in a public place and which "may, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of any law of Canada or a province or of any municipal ordi-
nance or by-law be affixed ... to any wooden fence situated on or
adjoining any highway",18 might favour a narrow construction of
the phrase "proceedings at elections", confining it to the official
documents and procedures essential to the functioning of a national
election, were it not for the fact that s. 71 specifically deals with
election posters and handbills. 19 The section requires that the poster
bear the name and address of its printer and publisher, and, therefore,
16 [1915] A.C. 330.
17 Statutes of Canada, 1960, c. 39.
18 Ibid., s. 100(2).
19 Supra, note 12.
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to this extent at least it is considered as "proceedings at elections".
The display of election signs is so intimately connected with the
course of elections, as they are known in Canada, that any prohibition
or restriction on the reasonable display of election advertisements
would constitute an interference with "proceedings at elections". The
freedom to express one's views and to solicit political support is the
very essence of an election and the dissemination of opinions and
solicitations to the public in the course of an election campaign is
to such a significant extent accomplished by means of posters, placards
and signs that their display ought to be construed as "proceedings at
elections". In Dionne v. Municipal Court of Montreal,20 a decision of
the Quebec Superior Court, Scott Associate C.J. overruled the magis-
trate's conviction of the appellant, a candidate for the Labour Pro-
gressive Party in a federal election, who, without having obtained
a permit from the Police Department, in contravention of a by-law,
distributed from door to door circulars soliciting votes. Scott Associate
C.J. stated:
In its pith and substance by-law 2077 manifestly encroaches upon and
usurps a field reserved exclusively for the authority of Parliament so far
as a Dominion election is concerned. By the B.N.A. Act Parliament and
the Legislatures of the Provinces respectively control their own elections
• 21
The subject matter of this legislation could also fall within the
residual jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada conferred by the
preamble of s. 91 of the B.N.A. Act. There is a critical relationship
between the free public discussion of political affairs and the function-
ing of a responsible democratic Parliament.
The statute [i.e. The British North America Act] contemplates a parlia-
ment working under the influence of public opinion and public discussion
... This is signally true in respect of the discharge by the Ministers of
the Crown of their responsibility to Parliament, by members of Parlia-
ment of their duty to the electors, and by the electors themselves of their
responsibilities in the election of their representatives.
22
The institution derives its vigour and vitality from the free concourse
and conflict of public opinion and public discussion. It is the life blood
of democratic self-government as we know it in Canada. In the words
of Duff C.J.C.:
We do not doubt.., that the Parliament of Canada possesses authority
to legislate for the protection of this right. That authority rests upon the
principle that the powers requisite for the protection of the constitution
itself arise by necessary implication from the British North America Act
as a whole . . . ; and since the subject-matter in relation to which the
power is exercised is not exclusively a provincial matter, it is necessarily
vested in Parliament. . .
Any attempt to abrogate this right of public debate or to suppress
the traditional forms of the exercise of the right (in public meeting and
through the press) would, in our opinion, be incompetent to the legisla.-
tures of the provinces, or to the legislation of any one of the provinces,
as repugnant to the provisions of the British North America Act... The
subject-matter of such legislation could not be described as a provincial
20 (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727.
21 Id. at 734.
22 Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100 at 133 per Duff C.J.C.
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matter purely; as in substance exclusively a matter of property and civil
rights within the province, or a matter private or local within the
province.23
Kerwin J. (as he then was) in Saumur v. City of Quebec24 dissented
from the views expressed by Duff C.J.C. and Cannon J. in Re Alberta
Statutes25 and advanced the opinion that the freedom of the press
like the right to practice one's religion were civil rights in the
province within the legislative scope of s. 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act.
It is open to argument that an election sign is in no sense an official
document but is advertising owned and paid for by a private in-
dividual whereby he hopes to solicit the votes of other private in-
dividuals, and the right to display his own advertising is a civil
right which it is within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature
to control. Rand J.,26 however, chose to follow the reasoning of Duff
C.J.C. in Re Alberta Statutes27 as also did Estey J.28 Kellock J., who
also approved of Duff C.J.C.'s reasoning, drew a distinction between
civil rights and public rights which transcend mere civil rights in
the province; 29 freedom of religion, he concluded, fell within this
latter category. It is submitted that, in view of his approval of the
reasoning of Duff C.J.C. and Cannon J., freedom of expression in
political affairs would also come within this class of rights. Election
posters and signs in the course of an election campaign are a
traditional form of the exercise of this right.
The impugned by-law purports to curtail inherent rights enjoyed by our
citizens in all politibal matters both before and after confederation and
protected by the B.N.A. Act. Both before and after 1867 candidates seek-
ing public office and their supporters had the right to solicit votes both
orally and by writing, provided of course such solicitation did not contra-
vene the criminal law.
30
Abbott J. in Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Que.,31 refers to the B.N.A.
Act and the Canada Elections Act 32 and continues:
Implicit in all such legislation is the right of candidates for Parliament
or for a Legislature, and of citizens generally, to explain, criticize, debate
and discuss in the freest possible manner such matters as the qualifica-
tions, the policies, and the political, economic and social principles advo-
cated by such candidates or by the political parties or groups of which
they may be members.
This right cannot be abrogated by a Provincial Legislature, and the
power of such Legislature to limit it, is restricted to what may be neces-
sary to protect purely private rights, such as for example provincial laws
of defamation.
33
Now that it has been established that the subject matter of the
by-law possesses aspects which could conceivably bring it within the
23 Id. at 133, 134.
24 (1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
25 [19383 S.C.R. 100.
26 (1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 325-334.
27 [19383 S.C.R. 100.
28 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 356-363.
29 Id. at 348, 349.
30 Dionne v. Municipal Court of Montreal (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727 at 735,
per Scott C.J.
31 [19573 S.C.R. 285.
32 R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.
33 [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 327, 328.
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legislative jurisdiction of both the provincial legislature and the
Dominion Parliament, the next step is to evaluate the relative im-
portance of these aspects. To some extent this has already been done,
but there remain to be considered certain details which might incline
the scales either in favour of the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of
the province or of the Dominion.
In several of the decisions involving by-laws placing restrictions
upon freedom of expression,34 the by-law contained a provision
whereby its application could be avoided by obtaining permission
from the chief of police or some other civic functionary. The Court
regarded such a condition as particularly objectionable in that it
placed a discretionary power in the hands of civic authorities, which
power could be exercised in favour of the established order and
denied to all others. In his decision in Saumur v. City of Quebec3s
Kellock J. intimated that "if the by-law were one which prohibited all
distribution in the streets, entirely different considerations would
very well apply". 36 The by-law in R. v. McKay applies to all signs
regardless of party affiliation. However, on the basis of the reasoning
of Duff C.J.C. in Be Alberta Statutes3 7 the by-law is objectionable
quite apart from the question of discrimination against any particu-
lar party or candidate. The decisive test is not whether the by-law
discriminates against a particular party but "whether [the] legisla-
tion effects such a curtailment of the exercise of the right of public
discussion as substantially to interfere with the working of the
parliamentary institutions of Canada". 38 Election posters and hand-
bills play a major role in bringing a candidate and his cause to the
attention of the electorate and establish some degree of acquaintance
without which an even remotely intelligent choice on the part of the
elector is impossible. It is of the essence of parliamentary government
that candidates for office be free to approach the electorate and make
their candidacy and ideas known to them by means of posters, pla-
cards and signs. Any gratuitous interference with this right is an
unwarranted restriction on the effectiveness of the democratic process
of government.
It is at this stage that the problems posed by Aylesworth J.A.
in the course of his judgment in B. v. McKay39 must be answered.
In one illustration the learned Justice describes a parade of consider-
able magnitude, consisting of adherents to a particular political party
engaged in the election, taking place in a crowded thoroughfare.
This, he states, would affect important civil rights within the
province; it would endanger the public peace, complicate the control
34 Baumur v. City of Quebec, [19531 2 S.C.R. 299; Suitzman v. Elbling
and A.-G. Que., [1957] S.C.R. 285; Dionne v. MunicipaZ Court of Montreal
(1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727.
35 [19531 2 S.C.R. 299.
36 Id. at 338.
37 [19381 S.C.R. 100.
38 OiZ, ChemicaZ and Atomic Workers Internationa Union v. Imperial Oil
Ltd., (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 1, per Martland J. at p. 12.
39 (1963), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401.
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of traffic, and interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by the
citizens.40 Is the province or municipality to stand by, impotent to
intervene, because the concourse could, in its broadest sense, be con-
sidered proceedings at elections? Would a homeowner be powerless
to prevent an exceptionally enthusiastic party worker from tacking
election posters all over the exterior of the homeowner's house in
the name of freedom of expression in political affairs? Could a can-
didate with impunity erect a large sign obscuring part of a busy
intersection or containing flashing red and green lights which would
be certain to attract a motorist's attention by causing a momentary
confusion with traffic signals? The answer to these questions is an
unequivocal no. The source of the provincial authority to intervene
in these cases is not an inherent jurisdiction over proceedings at
elections or the right of freedom of expression, but may be arrived
at by the canons of constitutional interpretation as enunciated in
John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton.41 The relative importance of the
aspects of the subject matter must be weighed against each other to
determine where the legislative competence lies. No one would deny
that in the above illustrations substantial civil rights are involved and
legislation by the province to remedy the situation would not con-
stitute a gratuitous interference in a federal subject matter, the
emphatic assertion of which in these illustrations amounts to license.
In such a situation the pith and substance of the provincial legislation
would not be in respect of proceedings at elections or freedom of
expression but in respect of "property and civil rights in the
province".
Because this was a subject matter with two different aspects
from the constitutional point of view, both Hughes J. and the Court
of Appeal arrived at the conclusion that this was a field of concurrent
jurisdiction. The former held that it had been fully occupied by the
Canada Elections Act,4 2 the latter accurately observed that the
Canada Elections Act43 makes almost no provision for election signs.
If effect is given to the finding of the Court of Appeal, in the absence
of specific federal legislation relating to election posters, the province
would be free to legislate on election posters per se, regulating their
colour, size and display or prohibiting them altogether even though
no substantial property or civil rights are at stake. But the right to
legislate in a concurrent field is a two-edged sword. Conversely the
Dominion Parliament could occupy the field and authorize all of the
absurd illustrations mentioned above.44 Such a result is not to be
countenanced. The doctrine of concurrent powers is applicable only
where it develops that the federal and provincial aspects of the
challenged law are of equivalent importance. Where this is the case,
the allocation of exclusive power one way or the other is not pos-
40 Id. at 403.
41 [1915] A.C. 330.
42 Statutes of Canada, 1960, c. 39.
43 Ibid.
44 SUpra, p. 11.
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sible.45 The issue in this case ultimately comes down to whether the
display of election posters on private property during the course of
an election campaign and the right to property owners in a neighbour-
hood to prevent the temporary display of such posters on the grounds
that it offends their taste, or detracts from the appearance of the
neighbourhood, are of equivalent importance.46 This is a question
* of values. It has been the contention of the writer that they are not
of equivalent importance, that the importance of permitting a can-
didate in an electoral campaign to present his message to the elec-
torate outweighs the temporary inconvenience to neighbouring land-
owners caused by the display of an election placard on private
property. If that is a true assessment of the relative values of the
competing interests, then this cannot be a concurrent field of legis-
lative jurisdiction and the power to authorize the enactment of such
a by-law is ultra vires the provincial legislature.
The true nature and character of an enactment is to be discerned by a
consideration of its meaning, purpose and effect, and does not depend
upon whether it is enacted by Parliament or by a Provincial legislature.
The statement of Lord Watson in Union ColZiery Company of British
Columbia v. Bryden has been repeatedly followed:
'The abstinence of the Dominion Parliament from legislating to the
full limit of its powers, could not have the effect of transferring to
any provincial legislature the legislative power which had been as-
signed to the Dominion by s. 91 of the Act of 1867.'47
Turning to the question which was raised at the beginning of this
investigation: does this particular by-law and the provincial legisla-
tion from which it derives its authority extend to election signs? This
problem was not considered by the Court of Appeal in view of their
assessment of provincial legislative powers. It is a principle of con-
stitutional interpretation that if possible such a meaning will be
given to a statute as to uphold its validity, for a legislative body must
be held to keep within its powers.48 It is submitted that Hughes J. was
correct in adopting the approach taken by Kerwin J. in Saumur v.
City of Quebec49 where the learned Justice, dealing with a similar
restrictive by-law, stated that the circumstances did not justify a
declaration that the by-law was ultra vires because it would have a
salutary effect in other circumstances; however, he did declare that
the by-law did not extend to prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from dis-
tributing books and pamphlets on the street.50 Similarly the by-law
45 W. R. Lederman, "Outline of an Approach to problems of the validity
of Federal or provincial laws under the B.N.A. Act."
46 c.f. People v. Stover, 12 NY 2d 462; 191 NE 2d 272; 240 NYS 2d 734
(1963) where a homeowner as a "political protest against high taxes" in
violation of a by-law hung laundry from year to year over his front lawn.
In a dissenting judgment it was maintained that the by-law exceeded the
municipality's zoning authority under the police power in that it was not
sufficiently related to the public safety, health, morals or welfare of the com-
munity but was directed solely towards aesthetic purposes. The attempt so to
restrict the police power to enact zoning by-laws appears to be a dying cause
in the U.S.A.
47 O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804, per Cartwright J. at 819.
48 MacLeod v. A.-G. N.S.W., [1891] A.C. 455.
49 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
50 Id., at 322.
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in issue and the legislation authorizing it is valid in so far as it
deals with signs, but does not extend to election signs qua election
signs displayed during the course of a federal election.
On the basis of R. v. McKay51 it is now the law in Ontario that
the provincial legislature is free to interfere with and legislate in
relation to an important segment of election advertising in federal
elections; on the other hand, provincial elections are wholly a matter
of provincial concern. In view of the complexity and detail of federal
election legislation, particularly in the Canada Elections Act,
5 2 it is
all the more striking that there should be an almost total absence of
any legislation with respect to such a fundamental element of Cana-
dian elections. It is to be hoped that the problems raised by the de-
cision of the Court of Appeal will be resolved by appropriate legisla-
tion or, should the problem again arise in the courts, by the Supreme
Court of Canada. It is in one sense a favourable comment on the
tolerance in Canada in political affairs and the healthy state of Cana-
dian democratic institutions that a need has never been felt for any
such legislation, and with the exception of Dionne v. Municipal Court
of Montreal,3 where the problem arose in a slightly varied form, this
matter has not been a subject of reported litigation in Canadian
courts.
J. W. MIK
DODDS & DODDS V. MILLMAN (1964) 45 D.L.R. (2d) 472-ToRT-
EXECUTED CONTRACT FOR SALE OF REALTY-AvAILABILITY OF REMEDY
FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION BY REAL ESTATE SALESMAN.-
Early in 1963, the House of Lords in principle settled the problem of
whether or not to grant a remedy in damages for negligent misrepre-
sentation by granting such relief in the case of Hedley, Byrne & Co.
v. Heller.' In the case of Dodds v. Millman2 the Supreme Court of
British Columbia decided to follow the lead of the English courts
and make this form of relief available in the province. It is probable
that other Canadian jurisdictions will also take this position. In effect
this amounts to the creation of an entirely new tort remedy, and con-
stitutes a bold departure from the position previously taken by the
courts.
Mr. and Mrs. Dodds, having purchased a North Vancouver apart-
ment building, suffered financial loss as the result of a grossly inade-
quate "operating statement" used by the real estate salesman in
promoting the sale. They framed their action in three different ways,
51 (1963), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 401.
52 Statutes of Canada, 1960, c. 39.
53 (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 727.
1 [1963) 2 All E.R. 575.
2 (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 472.
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